South Carolina Law Review
Volume 1

Issue 2

Article 3

12-1948

The Awarding of Punitive Damages for Breach of Insurance
Contracts in South Carolina
Hugh C. Howser

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Insurance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hugh C. Howser, The Awarding of Punitive Damages for Breach of Insurance Contracts in South Carolina,
1 S. C. L. Q. 150 (1948).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Howser: The Awarding of Punitive Damages for Breach of Insurance Contract

THE AWARDING OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
FOR BREACH OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
HUGH
I.

C. HOWSER *

DEVELOPMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW IN
SOUTH CAROLINA

By definition punitive, or exemplary, damages are damages
which are given in enhancement merely of the ordinary damages on account of the wanton, reckless, malicious, or oppressive character of the acts complained of. 15 Am. Jr., Damages
Sec. 265, p. 698. In South Carolina, however, by judicial construction, the rule concerning punitive damages has been
greatly enlarged and liberalized in cases involving insurance
contracts and the acts of agents of the various insurance
companies. The concern of the insurance companies over the
South Carolina rule was indicated in 1982 in an address 1 at
Toronto, Canada, by the late P. M. Estes, general counsel of
the Life and Casualty Insurance Company of Tennessee. The
importance of the problem to counsel for insurer and injured alike, and its development in the past sixteen years,
justify this review in an effort to determine, if possible, the
status of the law today and the trend of the later decisions.
As pointed out by Mr. Estes, South Carolina has developed
the rule that allows punitive, as well as actual, damages for
the breach of a contract accompanied by fraud, and such rule
obtains only in that jurisdiction. In no other state is it possible to recover punitive damages for breach of contract, insurance or otherwise, no matter if the event be willful, malicious, or fraudulent. And only in South Carolina is it possible to recover punitive damages for the tort growing out
of the breach of the insurance contract.
The rule in South Carolina stems from the case of Welborn
'v. Dixon.2 Plaintiff had conveyed a tract of land to defendant
• Member of the Nashville, Tennessee, bar; with the firm of Williams, Cumminus
& West.

1.
2.

Published in American Life Convention L. S. 1932, p. 169.
70 S. C. 108, 49 S. E. 232, 3 Am. Cas. 407 (1904).
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for $385.00 with a written agreement to reconvey on repayment of the consideration with interest. The defendant, however, sold the land for $600.00 and on tender of the $385.00
refused to reconvey, saying that he would rather spend
$1,000.00 rather than let plaintiff have anything out of it.
The court recognized the general rule, "that in an action for
breach of contract the motives of the wrongdoer are not to
be considered in estimating the amount of damages, and that
he is only liable for such damages as are the natural and proximate result of his wrongful act. When, however, the breach
of the contract is accompanied with a fraudulent act, the rule
is well settled, certainly in this State, that the defendant may
be made to respond in punitive as well as compensatory damages".
The first insurance case involving this question was Prince
v. State Mutual Life Insurance Co. 3 The policy delivered was
in accordance with plaintiff's application but differed from
his agreement with the agent, and he brought suit. The jury
gave a verdict for $500.00 punitive damages, but this was reversed on appeal, the Court holding that no fraudulent act
was alleged.
Williams v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. 4 was the first insurance case in which punitive damages were recovered. There
the agent had sold a "sample copy" by making alterations on
the policy and the court held that such acts were fraudulent
and allowed a recovery of $30.00 actual and $1,000.00 punitive
damages. The Court said:
"The principal is responsible in punitive damages for
fraudulent acts of his agent done in course of his employment, even when they may have been performed contrary
to the express directions of the principal."
Following the Williams case came the best known punitive
damages case in South Carolina, Bradley v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.5 There the alleged fraud was the procurement
of the policy from the beneficiary by the agent when he knew
that the claim would be denied because of physician's statement that insured was suffering from tuberculosis at date
of issue, and also the withholding of the policy by the corn3. 77 S. C. 187, 57 S. E. 766 (1907).
4. 159 S. C. 301, 156 S. E. 871 (1931).,
5. 162 S. C. 303, 160 S. E. 721 (1931).
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pany. There was a verdict of $186.00 actual damages, plus
$40.70 interest, and $2,000 punitive damages, and the Williams case was cited as authority for punitive damages.
Crosby v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 6 was mentioned
in Mr. Estes' paper as a case where the agent represented
to plaintiff that she was the beneficiary, when in fact the policy was payable to the estate of insured. The verdict was
$540.00 actual damages, and $2,400.00 punitive damages,
which the court reduced to $1,200.00. The appeal had not been
7
heard from at the date of Mr. Estes' paper.
This was the development of the punitive damage law in
regard to insurance contracts in South Carolina in 1932 when
it was generally felt that it was impossible to tell what acts
would be called a fraudulent breach of contract and therefore
,justify punitive damages.

II.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF INSURANCE CONTRACT
JUSTIFYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND How ARE
SUCH DAMAGES DETERMINED

A.

In General.

A study of the more recent decisions in South Carolina will
lead to no well established or well defined rule as to what acts
of an insurance company, its agents and employees, will
amount to fraudulent conduct justifying punitive damages.
The law governing the cases is well settled, that where a
fraudulent breach of contract is accompanied by a fraudulent
act, the defendant may be made to respond in punitive as well
as compensatory damages. The difficulty in ascertaining which
acts may be held to be fraudulent, can be shown by referring
to the decision by Justice Fishburne in Thomas v. American
Workmen Insurance Co.8 The alleged fraud there was misrepresentation by agent of content of policy. The defense was the
negligence of insured in failing to use reasonable diligence
for his own protection in finding out the contents, and relying on the agent. The Court said:
"Whether or not reliance upon a representation in a
particular case is justifiable, or excusable, what consti6. 161 S. C. 519, 159 S. E. 926 (1931).
7. The final result in this case discussed infra.
8. 197 S. C. 178, 14 S. E. 2d 886 (1941).
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tutes reasonable prudence and diligence with respect to
such reliance, and what conduct constitutes a reckless or
conscious failure to exercise such prudence, will depend
upon the various circumstances involved, such as the form
and materiality of the representations, the respective intelligence, experience, age, and mental and physical condition of the parties, and the relation and respective
knowledge of the parties.
"It is undoubtedly true that the principle of the right
of reliance is closely bound up with a duty on the part
of the representative to use some measure of protection
and precaution to safeguard his interests. We approve
the rule which was given by the trial court in its instruction to the jury in the case, and that is in respect to
the right to rely upon representation, every person must
use reasonable diligence for his own protection. So that
the solution of the question will depend upon the particular situation of each case."
Even as the question of fraud must depend upon the factual situation of each case, so also must the facts of each case
be examined to determine the amount of punitive damages
allowable. The only rule as to punitive damages for breach
of contract in South Carolina is the one laid down in Barnes
v. Industrial Life & Healt, Insurance Co. of Atlanta,9 that
punitive damages are not recoverable without proof of actual
or nominal damages. But even then there was strong dissent
based on Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co.,10 where it
was held that "upon a conscious and willful violation of legal
rights the law will presume damages sufficient to maintain
an action, even though such damages be only nominal, and
not capable of exact measurement, and in such suits a verdict for punitive damages without a finding of actual damages will be sustained." But no rule as to amount of such punitive damages has been given and they are said to be allowed
as a punishment of defendant and as a determent to others.
Punitive damages are recoverable on two theories: The first
and one on which most of the actions are brought is fraudulent
breach of the insurance contract accompanied by a fraudulent
act; the second sounds in tort and the action is based on fraud
9. 201 S. C. 189, 22 S. E. 2d 1 (1942).
10. 183 S. C. 279, 190 S. E. 923 (1937).
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and deceit of the company acting through its agent or representative. Crosby v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., ;supra,n
mentioned in Mr. Estes' paper, is an example of these theories.
At the time the paper was prepared the plaintiff had obtained a judgment for the face amount of the policy, $540.00,
as actual damages and $1,200.00 punitive damages. Facts were
that agent had represented to plaintiff that she was the beneficiary under the policy so that plaintiff would continue paying premiums, when in fact the policy was payable to insured's
estate. After the date of the paper the case was appealed and
the South Carolina Supreme Court in an opinion in 167 S. C.
255, 166 S. E. 266 (1932), held that the action was not on
the fraudulent breach of insurance contract, which was a valid
policy payable to estate of insured, but on the fraud and deceit arising out of the promise of the agent that plaintiff was
beneficiary. As the action was not on the policy, the charge
by the court that damages would be the face amount of the
policy, $540.00, was misleading, and it should be the amount
of premium paid, that is 45¢ per week for 26 weeks, amounting to $11.70. The punitive damages were allowed to stand
and judgment was for $1,211.70, 103 times the actual damages, even though the policy was a valid contract. So although
there are two theories on which a plaintiff can recover, the
method chosen does not seem to have any relation to the
amount of punitive damages recoverable.
Although we cannot formulate a rule defining fraudulent
conduct by an insurance company, it is possible to determine
what acts of an insurance company, its agents and representatives, have been alleged to be fraudulent, and the result of
these attempts to hold companies liable in punitive damages.
B.

Alleged FraudulentActs.

1.

Failure of agent to call for premium as is his custom,
and lapsing of policy as a result of the failure to receive
premium.

In Mack v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 2 the alleged
fraud was failure of agent to call at home of insured for
weekly premium as was his custom for about 10 years, and
the subsequent failure of company to accept premium at home
11. Footnote 6.
12. 171 S. C. 350, 172 S. E. 305 (1934).
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office. For this fraudulent act plaintiff was awarded $160.00
acutal damages and $750.00 punitive damages, on a policy
with $5.00 weekly sick benefit and $60.00 death benefit.
Pack v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.13 was a case in
which the alleged fraud was failure of the agent to call for
premium. But the evidence there failed to prove any fraud
as it showed that plaintiff had moved, had failed to advise
agent of her address, and that agent had attempted to locate
her, but was unable to do so. The lower court's verdict of
$174.00 actual damages and $500.00 punitive damages on a
$115.00 face value policy with $58.00 disability provision was
reversed and recovery was allowed only for actual damages,
which were defined by Justice Bonham, thus:
"It is the sum of the premiums which have been paid
by the insured, and loss by the lapse of the policy, and,
the damage which the plaintiff has sustained by such
lapse, to be ascertained, as for example, by ascertaining
the life expectancy and the amount she would be required
to pay for insurance of like character during such period,
but such sum cannot equal the amount of the lapsed policy; and of course, any special damage which plaintiff has
suffered."
This case has been followed and the same conclusion reached
in several of the cases hereinafter referred to and is the rule
today on actual damages for breach of insurance contract in
South Carolina.
In Sturkie v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., 14 the alleged fraud was agent's act in telling plaintiff that he would
no longer call for weekly premium, and her account would be
transferred to home office. In addition insured visited district
office and made tender of her premiums, which were refused.
The face value of policy was $144.00, and jury found $45.00
actual damages and $1,500.00 punitive damages. This verdict
was upheld by the Supreme Court which cited Mack v. Life
& Casualty, supra.1o
The alleged fraud in Holder v. Sovereign Camp W. 0. W.16
was failure of financial secretary to find insured's card and re13. 178 S. C. 272, 182 S. E. 747 (1935).

14. 180 S. C. 177, 185 S. E. 541 (1936).
15. Footnote 12.
16. 180 S. C. 242, 185 S. E. 547 (1936).
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fusal to accept premiums. The actual damages in that case was
said to be governed by rule of Pack v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., above.17
Alexander v. Durham Life Insurance Co.' s was a case in
which alleged fraud was refusal to accept premiums, and the
cancellation of policy. The policy provided for $44.00 death
benefit and $4.00 per week for 26 weeks disability payments.
There was conflicting testimony as to when premiums were
tendered and Court held that this made proper issue for
jury. And the refusal to grant non-suit as to punitive damages on grounds of failure of evidence tending to support alleged fraud was held not to be error where insured was old,
ignorant, and trusted insurer's agent who misinformed insured as to physical disabilities necessary to entitle insured
to benefits. The trial court's verdict was $1,600.00 actual and
$150.00 punitive damages. The actual damages were reduced
by $100.00 and the verdict otherwise affirmed.
Another leading case is Riley v. Life & Casualty Insurance
Co.,'19 where agent failed to call for premium as was his custom. The agent in this case was acting on orders from the
District Manager who had seen insured and knew he was no
longer insurable. There was sufficient testimony to go to jury
on question of fraud and jury found $36.00 actual damages
and $1,000.00 punitive damages on industrial policy of
$155.00 face value. This verdict was affirmed, the Supreme
Court saying the jury having found fraud, such fraud will
support the verdict.
A very late similar case is Clinkscales v. North Carolina
Mutual Life Insurance Co.20 In that case insurance company
had issued in 1936 a health, accident and death benefit policy,
and premium was 25¢ weekly. The agent called for this premium regularly until 1939 and 1940 when insured became ill.
During the period of illness some sick claims were paid, some
were not. Plaintiff's testimony was that she sent premiums
to agent during this period but on each occasion he refused
to accept them. Finally in November, 1940, agent did accept
$1.50 premium, later returning and having insured sign an
application for revival while sick in bed. Plaintiff was able to
17.
18.
19.
20.

Footnote 13.
181 S. C. 331, 187 S. E. 425 (1936).
184 S. C. 383, 192 S. E. 394 (1937).
201 S. C. 375, 23 S. E. 2d 1 (1942).
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read and write, but did not read the application she signed.
This application was claimed by defendant to be a release
of all claims. There was a verdict for plaintiff for $1,500.00.
This was upheld on appeal because tender by plaintiff during
grace period, plus the sick claim due, was sufficient to keep
the policy in force and- therefore the cancellation of it was
fraudulent, the agent knowing that plaintiff was not insurable
when he ceased calling for premiums. The actual and punitive
damages were not separated in the decree.
An interesting late case is Harwell v. Mutual Benefit Health
& Accident Assn.2' This was an action for the recovery of
damages, actual and punitive, for the alleged wrongful and
fraudulent refusal of defendant to accept a renewal premium
on an accident policy. Verdict was for $46.50 actual and
$1,250.00 punitive damages.
The policy provided, in large and conspicuous words on
page one-Death Benefit without increase $1,000, with full
increase $2,000.00. Premium required was $6.50 first year and
$5.00 per year thereafter to keep the policy continually in
force. In small print on page three, the policy provided that
the acceptance of a renewal premium was optional with the
company. Policy was issued in 1934, and refusal to accept
premium was on June 21, 1943. The policy provided that mailing of notice at least 18 days before due constituted legal notice of premium due date. The local agent of company had
established a custom of calling for the receipt of annual premium. However, the local agent had withdrawn from the company prior to due date, May 1, 1943, and plaintiff did not
make payment until June 12, 1943, when he mailed premium
directly to the company. The company returned the premium
payment.
The Court's minority opinion, written by Justice Fishburne,
held that the policy was an unconditional continuing contract,
terminable only upon failure to pay premiums, notwithstanding the provision that acceptance of renewal premium was
optional with the company.
That issue being decided, the Court passed on to the question of damages for the breach of the contract. Plaintiff insisted that the breach was fraudulent because of the following circumstances: (a) by so wording its contract as to de21. 207 S. C. 150, 35 S. E. 2d 160 (1945).
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ceive the insured into purchasing what appellant now claims
is, at its option, not a continuous policy, although from its
major provisions, it appears to be a continuous contract with
cumulative benefits; (b) cancelling the policy only after the
accumulated benefits had nearly reached their maximum;
(c) after its local agent had withdrawn from its employment,
appellant deliberately failed to notify the insured that it
would no longer have an agent to collect its premiums; (d)
establishing a custom over a long period of time of collecting
the annual premium by its agent, then suddenly and without
warning breaking the custom; (e) failing to send the plaintiff notice (as was its practice) of the due date of the annual
premium; (f) refusing the plaintiff's renewal premium after
having maneuvered him into default and continuing to refuse
to reinstate the policy until after this action had been instituted.
The minority held that the mailing of notice had a bearing
on the charge of fraud, when after a custom was established,
it was suddenly stopped. Also an evasive letter received by the
plaintiff from the company when his premium was returned,
was an element supporting the charge of fraud. The Court
then said:
"After a careful examination of the record in the light
of previous decision, we are unable to conclude as a
matter of law that the evidence in the case excludes all
reasonable inference of fraud."
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Chief Justice Baker,
agreed that the policy was a continuous one, and that actual
damages were recoverable for the breach thereof, but that
the evidence did not justify punitive damages. The failure
to give notice, it was pointed out, was not such a fraudulent
failure to notify as would justify punitive damages. Neither
would the conduct of the company in refusing to accept renewal premiums, when such action was bona fide, the officers
relying on a clause in the policy which they thought legal and
valid. The judgment for actual damages was affirmed and for
punitive damages reversed by the majority.
2.

The procurement of the policy at death of insured and failure to return policy when company denies liability.
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Bradley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra,2" was
-the first case to award punitive damages for failure of company to return policy after it had been procured by agent at
insured's death. Just what the fraudulent act was, the procuring the policy with knowledge that the claim would be demied, or the withholding of the policy by the company, was
not made clear, but the entire action was said to justify punitive damages of $2,000.00
A later case is Cook v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,2 which was an action for fraud and deceit for defendant's alleged failure to revive or return an industrial
life policy. Plaintiff held life policy of $240.00 issued in 1904,
'having paid up value of $136.00. Twice the policy had lapsed
.and had been reinstated by a premium lien endorsed thereon.
In 1934, the policy again having lapsed, plaintiff made application to defendant company to revive the policy and at the
.same time delivered policy to agent who promised to revive
and return policy. Defendant did neither and this is the alleged fraud. Trial resulted in a $5.00 nominal damage and
,$256.00 punitive damages. Supreme Court affirmed, saying,
through Justice Fishburne:
"When one promises to do a certain thing, having at
the time no intention of keeping the agreement, it is a
fraudulent misrepresentation of fact, and actionable as
such. The interest of agent when he procured policy and
question of fraudulent representation made a question
for jury."
This case not only restates the rule of the Bradley case, but
oalso lays down the rule that punitive damages may be awarded
in absence of actual damages, if nominal damages are shown.
Nominal damages are recoverable for any breach of legal
,duty, even though no actual damages are shown. This case,
then, would seem to indicate that the slightest breach of duty
by defendant would give rise to punitive damages. The rule
does not go that far, however, and in Barnes v. Industrial Life
& Health Insurance Company of Atlanta,24 it is said that punitive damages cannot be given without actual or nominal damages. In that case there had been no actual injury to plaintiff
22. Footnote 5.
23. 186 S. C. 77, 194 S. E. 636 (1938).
24. Footnote 9.
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and defendant had acted in good faith. Justice Fishburne dissented, however, on the basis of the holding in the Cook case,
supra, that "upon a conscious and willful violation of legal
rights the law will presume damages sufficient to sustain an
action, even though siuich action be only nominal, and not capable of exact measurement, and in such case a verdict for
punitive damages, without a finding of actual damages will
be sustained."
The rule today, however, in South Carolina, is that if conduct of defendant in breaching a contract will allow a recovery of even nominal damages, then punitive damages may
also be recovered. For defendant to resist punitive damages
his conduct must be of such character that even nominal damages could not be assessed against him.
In Henderson v. Capital Life and Health Insurance Co., 2 a
policy of $116.00 was issued and delivered by agent to insured's father. No premium was paid at time of delivery and
policy contained no stipulation that it would not be effective
until payment of premium. Agent agreed to collect premium on
his next visit, but the insured died before agent collected the
premium. Agent thereupon procured policy and refused to return it to beneficiary. It was held that it was a question for the
jury whether or not policy was in force at date of insured's
death. The jury returned a verdict for actual and punitive
damages. This was affirmed, the court holding that the manner of collecting premiums may be waived and credit extended.
In Barber v. Industrial Life & Health Co.,26 suit was for
alleged breach of contract, accompanied by fraudulent act of
insurer. Plaintiff was administrator of the estate of beneficiary of life policy on the life of one Phillip Mitchell. The
fraudulent act alleged is that after the death of Phillip Mitchell, the company switched or substituted a sick and accident
policy, with death benefit of $50.00, in place of "straight life"
policy of $250.00. It appeared that in his lifetime Phillip
Mitchell had two policies with defendant company, one a sick
and accident, the other a straight life. The premium was 255
per week on each policy. The Company records and proof offered by company showed that the "straight life" policy had
lapsed, but that plaintiff's intestate had paid the premiums
on sick and accident policy until death of insured.
25. 199 S. C. 100, 18 S. E. 2d 605 (1942).
26. 189 S. C. 108, 200 S. E. 102 (1938).
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Plaintiff's proof was that they had no knowledge of sick
and accident policy; that a "straight life" policy had been
issued to Phillip Mitchell'and plaintiff's intestate had it in her
possession and had paid all premiums thereon. Further the
premium receipt books, except the last one, had the number
of the "straight life" policy in them, and plaintiff's intestate
had no knowledge that the number was changed in the last
book. Proof showed that insured was sick one and one-half
years prior to his death, and that the collecting agent had
seen the insured sick man and in bed, and that no claim had
been filed, the insured believing he had only a life policy.
The verdict was for $250.00 actual and $1,500.00 punitive
damages, the latter being reduced to $1,000.00 by the court.
The judgment was affirmed, the court saying that the question of fraudulent act was very close, and but for the changing of the number of the policy in the last receipt book by
the agent, the duty of the trial court would have been to direct a verdict for defendant on the question of punitive damages.
3.

Agent's misrepresentationof coverage of policy.

Whether the representations of an agent as to the contents
of the policy will amount to fraud or not depends on all circumstances surrounding the case. Thomas v. American Workmen Insurance Co., supra.P In Jamison v. American Workmen Insurance Co.,2 the defendant company issued to plaintiff, an illiterate colored woman, a policy providing for weekly sick benefits of $6.00 and death benefit of $2,000. The agent
represented that the company would give ten days' notice of
the due date of each monthly premium. For over a year the
company gave notice and received and accepted all premiums,
although all of the premiums did not arrive promptly. Thereafter the insured became ill and remained in such condition
for six weeks. The company sent no notice of payments due
for two months and thereafter refused the tender of premiums by plaintiff and cancelled the policy. The action was
for fraudulent cancellation of insurance contract and resulted
in a verdict for plaintiff of $20.00 actual damages and $480.00
punitive damages. In affirming, the Court said:
27. Footnote 8.
28. 169 S. C. 400, 169 S. E. 83 (1933).
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"The testimony of the plaintiff, the literature furnished
her, the letters written her by the company, and the
reasonable inference which may be drawn from the testimony, the literature, and the correspondence, were sufficient in our opinion, to require the Court to submit the
issue of both actual and punitive damages, the latter on
ground of fraudulent conduct on the part of the insurer,
to the jury. The representations of 'the agent, the promises made, and the course of conduct of the insurer and
its agents, all taken together, in the absence of any denial or explanation by the agent, were such as to justifythe jury verdict."
And in Schultz v. Benefit Association of R. E.,. a case
wherein the agent of defendant represented to plaintiff that
the new policy was "non-cancelable," but upon a change of'
position by plaintiff, the defendant refused to accept premiums, a verdict of both actual and puntive damages was re-covered, the Court saying:
"This court has held repeatedly that where an insurance company refuses to accept premiums and it is clearly shown that the intention of the company is to cancel
out policies which are existent and upon which rights.
have accrued, such action, on the part of the companywill sustain a verdict for punitive damages. Wilkes v.
Carolina, Life, 166 S. C. 475, 165 S. E. 188; McLoud v.
Met. Life Ins. Co., 167 S. C. 309, 166 S. E. 343; Sutton
v. Continental Casualty Co., 168 S. C. 372, 167 S.E. 647;
Mack v. Life & Casualty Co., 171 S. C. 350, 172 S. E.
305."
The ease of Thomas v. American Workmen Insurance Company, supra, 0 allowing actual and punitive damages for misrepresentation of the agent, has already been discussed.
In Speed v. American Workmen Insurance Co..31 the plaintiff alleged that the agent of the company assured her that
identical policies were issued to her boy and girl. The daughter died within six months of the date of the policy and plaintiff gave the policy to the agent for collection. The defendant
29. 175 S. C. 182, 178 S. E. 867 (1935).

30. Footnote 8.
31. 199 S. C. 187, 18 S. E. 2d 732 (1942).
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company failed to return the original policy, but returned a
substituted policy that limited liability. The policy held by the
boy did not contain this limitation of liability clause. The
jury found for plaintiff $296.00 as actual damages and $800.00
punitive damages. The court held that $800 was not excessive,
but in order to promote substantial justice he would reduce
it to $400.00 punitive damages. The verdict was affirmed on
appeal.
In McCullough v. The American Workmen,32 the suit was
for fraudulent breach of a life, health and accident policy.
Policy provided that monthly dues of $1.15 would never be increased, and the agent so advised plaintiff. Later the company
raised dues to $1.35 per month and refused to accept plaintiff's offer of $1.15. Plaintiff, a colored woman of simple mind,
was awarded $200.00 actual and $800.00 punitive damages
by the jury. The $200.00 was reduced to $184.50 by the Court.
The Supreme Court, opinion by Chief Justice Bonham, reversed, holding that suit was ex contratu, based on the alleged breach of contract and not ex delicto, as no fraud was
alleged in the inception of the contract. The Court further
held that the plaintiff had elected her remedy in contract, and
was therefore estopped from asserting an action for fraud
and deceit in its inception.
4.

The waiver by the company of the exact requirements of
a policy by granting extensions, credits, etc., followed by
cancellation or lapsing of policy contrary to the established custom of dealing.

A case illustrating this section is Welch v. Missouri State
Life Insurance Co.3 In that case it appeared that insurer had
from time to time granted extensions, accepted post-dated
checks and waived provision requiring premium to be paid
on due date. The insurer wrote insured after one of such extensions, and enclosed further extension notes, but four days
thereafter cancelled policy. The court held that such wrongful cancellation by the insurer gave the insured the right to
actual damages, but as there was no fraudulent intent by
insurer punitive damages could not be recovered. The Court
82. 200 S. C. 84, 20 S. E. 2d 640 (1942).

33. 176 S. C. 494, 180 S. E. 447 (1935).
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quoted this rule from Williams v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company :4
"Punitive damages are not recoverable for a mere
breach of contract. To recover damages of that character, the plaintiff must show that the breach was accomplished with a fraudulent intention, and was accompanied
by a fraudulent act. Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S. C. 108;
Holland v. Spartanburg, 166 S. C. 454, and many other
cases too numerous to mention.
"Acts of willfulness, accompanying the breach of contract, unless there is fraud also, will not support a claim
for punitive damages. Holland case, supra.
"The mere violation of a contract is not sufficient to
support an allegation of fraud. Holland case, supra; Caldwell v. Duncan, 87 S. C. 331; Coleman v. Stevens, 124
S. C. 8."
5. Fraud and deceit practiced by agent independent of tho
insurance contract.
Two of the earliest cases authorizing a recovery of punitive
damages against an insurance company for breach of contract
were based on the acts of the agent. Williams v. Commercial
Casualty Co. and Crosby v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, supra. The Williams case gave punitive damages for
acts of the agent that not only were outside the contract, but
were performed contrary to the express direction of his principal. The Crosby case illustrated the distinction between a
recovery for breach of contract, and for fraud and deceit of
the agent.
In an action by the beneficiary for damages for fraud in
that the agent represented that the policy would be payable
upon the death of the insured for any cause, when in fact it
was an accident policy, a recovery was denied in Frierson v.
Inter-Ocean Casualty Co.,3 6 because the beneficiary who took
out the policy and signed the application was possessed of
intelligence, could read and write, kept the policy in force
until the death of her sister, the insured, and had ample opportunity to learn the character and contents of the policy.
34. 173 S. C. 448, 176 S. E. 340.
35. Footnotes 4 and 6.
36. 168 S. C. 178, 167 S. E. 232 (1933).
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Hood v. Life & Casualty Co.37 was a similar case where the
court held that failure of the beneficiary to learn the contents
of an accident policy would prohibit her recovery in an action
based on fraudulent representations of the agent.
In Souba v. Life Insurance Company of Virginiaj the negligence of the beneficiary precluded a recovery by her in an
action based on fraud and deceit by an agent of the company.
There the plaintiff had paid the premiums because of the false
statement of the agent that she was the named beneficiary.
However, the evidence showed that the plaintiff had read the
policy and remarked that the named beneficiary had not been
changed. Plaintiff also kept the policy in her possession for a
number of months without making an inquiry at the office
of the company, although she lived a short distance therefrom.
And in Knox v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,39 plaintiff recovered $43.75 actual and $800.00 punitive damages for
failure of agents to accept premiums from plaintiff. The policy had been in force nearly ten years, and the offered premium of $3.00, plus a $2.00 receipt for dividend would have
enabled plaintiff to obtain a loan on said policy. A loan on the
policy would have resulted in a decrease in the agent's income;
hence the agent's refusal to accept same. The plaintiff also
wrote the Home Office of the Company, but received no reply
for over thirty days. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
It is thus seen that the facts in the respective cases are controlling as to fraud. Justice Fishburne in Thomas v. American
Workmen Insurance Co., supra,40 gave a splendid view of the
attitude of the courts when he said:
"The policy of the Courts is on the one hand, to suppress fraud, and on the other, not to encourage negligence and inattention to one's own interest. Either course
has obvious dangers. But the unmistakable drift is toward the just doctrine that a wrongdoer cannot shield
himself from liability by asking the law to condemn the
credulity of the ignorant and unwary."
37.
38.
39.
40.

173 S. C. 139, 175 S. E. 76 (1934).
187 S. C. 311, 197 S. E. 826 (1938).
190 S. C. 504, 3 S. E. 2d 245 (1939).
Footnote 8.
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C.

Available Defenses.

Any lawsuit alleging fraudulent conduct by an insurance
company fiecessitates a defense by the company. The facts
of any case determine the practicability of any defense, and
likewise what ground to stand on if a defense is undertaken.
An examination of the various defenses pleaded, and the results thereof, in various cases, would seem to be in order.
1. No fraudulentact is alleged.
This defense seems to be the most widely used and, of
course, will continue to be so. When issue is taken as to whether or not any given act constitutes fraud, there is usually presented a question which only a jury can decide. A survey of
the cases indicates that most of the juries find that any act
of an agent or official of the insurance company that tends
to deny liability is a fraudulent act. The fraudulent act having been determined, punitive damages that are allowed for
this fraud have in many cases soared to unbelievable heights.
It would be unfair not to mention that the courts, on numerous occasions, have, in order to promote substantial justice, reduced these judgments.
In one of the early cases seeking punitive damages from
an insurance company for fraud, Prince v. State Mutual Life
Insurance Co., supra,4 the jury returned a verdict of $500.00
punitive damages. This was allowed to stand in the lower
court but the Supreme Court reversed as to punitive damages
as no fraudulent act was alleged. And in Speed v. American
Workmen's Insurance Co., supra,4 the jury's verdict of
$800.00 punitive damages was reduced to $400.00 by the court.
In Crosby v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.4 the punitive
damages agreed on by the jury was $2,400.00 and this was
reduced to $1,200.00. It must be remembered that in an action
based on tort there may be an allowance of punitive damages
although no actual damages are shown. Fields v. Lancaster
Cotton Mills,44 and Doster v. Western Union.45 And it has been
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Footnote 3.
Footnote 31.
Footnote 6.
77 S. C. 546, 58 S. E. 608 (1907).
77 S. C. 56, 57 S. E. 671 (1907).
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pointed out how nominal damages alone will support a verdict
for punitive damages for fraudulent breach of contract.
In Welch v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co.4 punitive
damages were denied because there was no fraudulent act
alleged. Defendant company had cancelled plaintiff's policy
four days after it had sent extension notes. This was a negligent and wrongful act, but not fraudulent, the court held, and
allowed actual damages, but refused punitive damages.
Pack v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra,47 referred
to above as establishing the South Carolina rule for actual
damages, also denied punitive damages where the alleged
fraud was the agent's failure to call for premiums. The evidence showed that the plaintiff had moved and that agent had
attempted to locate plaintiff and had searched diligently for
her, but had been unable to locate her.
Although the policies uniformly provide for the payment
of premiums at the home office, the cases generally hold that
the failure of the agent to call for premiums, after having
established a custom or course of dealing, and the resulting
cancellation of the policy, is a fraudulent act. To defeat this
the defendant must show that there was no scheme to cancel
the policy and that the agent made efforts to collect premiums,
as in the Pack case.
2.

Full disclosure by agent at the time of applications,during
the life of the policy, and after claim nade.

A case showing full disclosure is Moore v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.48 That was an action for fraud and deceit for
failure of the defendant company to issue a 20-year payment
policy. The plaintiff had applied for a life policy in 1936, but
the application was refused because plaintiff was under
weight. An "industrial endowment" policy was issued, however, and plaintiff testified that before the endowment policy
was issued to her she decided to apply for a 20-year pay policy and the agent advised her that he would secure it for her.
The company refused to make this change and this is the alleged fraud. In holding for the defendant company, the court
held that no fraud and deceit existed since plaintiff was kept
46. 176 S. C. 494, 180 S. E. 447 (1935).
47. Footnote 13.
48. 189 S. C. 44, 199 S. E. 904 (1938).
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advised at all times; First, that straight life could not be issued
because she was underweight; and second, that 20-year pay
could not be issued for the same reason; the endowment policy
was issued in lieu thereof.
The defense of full disclosure is, of course, a direct denial
of fraud and is, in effect the same defensive plea as no allegation of fraud. Thus where the insured had been supplied
with the application for reinstatement after policy had lapsed,
and then had sued for disability benefits under the policy, the
defense was based on the statement of the insured In the application. The court held:
".... we can find no evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the appellant fraudulently
breached the contract of insurance or practiced 'fraud
or deceit' in the procurement of any of the re-instatement
applications." Glenn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 202
S. C. 316, 24 S.E. 2d 609 (1943).
And in King v. North CarolinaMutual,49 it was held that
failure to supply insured with application blanks for disability payment was not evidence of fraud, and the judgment for
punitive damages was reversed. Actual damages were allowed
however.
The defense of full disclosure usually results in a jury
question as to whether there was such disclosure or not. In
most cases where an agent procured policy at the death of the
insured, in accordance with the terms of most industrial policies, so that the claim might be submitted to the company,
the juries have held such acts fraudulent upon the disallowance of the claim by the company. The defense of full disclosure must be denied by plaintiff, thus making an issue for the
jury, and the cases seem to indicate that the average jury in
South Carolina has given more credit to the statements of the
plaintiff than to the denials of fraud by the defendant.
Admitting the fraud of defendant, the failure of plaintiff
to avail himself of the contents and coverage of policy is
such negligence as to preclude recovery.
This defense is governed in Thomas v. American Workmen
Insurance Co., supra,5 that recovery will depend on the va3.

49. 194 S. C.367, 9 S. E. 2d 788 (1940).
50. Footnote 5.
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rious circumstances involved. It has been repeatedly pointed
out that what would constitute negligence by a reasonably
prudent man is not the test for an illiterate and ignorant
plaintiff, and that each case must rest on its own merits.
Souba v. Life Insurance Company of Virginia,supra,51 Hood
v. Life & Casualy Insurance Co., supra,52 and Frierson v. In53
are all cases wherein the negligence
ter-Ocean Co., supra,
of plaintiff in failing to learn the contents of the policy prevented a recovery.
A later case showing how plaintiff's negligence can prevent
54
recovery is Bull v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. The
headnote gives the holding:
"Where insured knew from interest notice which she
received periodically from 1933 to commencement of action in 1938, and from loan certificate bearing her signature, which were attached to life policy, the loans were
charged against her, but she continued all the while to
pay interest charges without protest, and did not notify
insurer of alleged forgery of signature on application for
loans, even if insured was defrauded, she was barred
by her own conduct constituting 'waiver' from bringing
action because of the alleged fraud."
4.

A previous action on same policy for fraudulent breach
of contract resulting in a verdict for defendant company
will bar a subsequent suit based on same policy for fraud
and deceit, the defense of "res judicata" being applicable.

This is a special plea that would only be available under
a particular factual arrangement. However, it is well to know
that the courts will not allow plaintiff a second chance at a
recovery on the identical sets of facts. This was the holding
in Smith v. Volunteer State Life Insurance Co.5' Facts of the
case were that on June 14, 1939, plaintiff as administratrix
brought suit against the defendant company for full amount
of $5,000.00 policy for breach of insurance contract accompanied by fraudulent act. The case was removed to Federal
51. Footnote 38.
52. Footnote 37.
53. Footnote 36.
54. 195 S. C. 536, 12 S. E. 2d 24 (1940).
55. 201 S. C. 291, 22 S. E. 2d 885 (1942).
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Court where a non-suit was ordered because evidence that
was introduced showed that plaintiff was not entitled to recovery. Thereafter on April 19, 1941, plaintiff brought suit
against the same defendant on the same policy for $2,900.00
actual and punitive damages for fraud and deceit. The jury
found a verdict for plaintiff for $1,658.10 actual and $1,241.90
punitive damages. On appeal this verdict was reversed, the
Court saying in part:
"The essential elements of res adjudicata are: (1)
Identity of the parties: (2) identity of the subject matter; and (3) an adjudication in the former suit of the
precise question sought to be raised in the second suit...
there was an identity of the parties . . . there was an
identity of the subject matter ... We do not think that a
party may bring an action for a breach of contract, and
having lost that case, afterwards maintain another suit
for an earlier breach of the identical contract. We think
that the judgment of the Federal Court was conclusive
in the second action."
Glenn v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.56 was mentioned
before as a case wherein plaintiff failed to establish fraud.
While the Court did make this finding the case was actually
decided on the legal ground of res judicata. The plaintiff had
brought an action for benefits, provided by disability feature
of life policy, but a verdict was directed for the company because of plaintiff's statement in reinstatement application that
he was in good health. No appeal was taken. Later plaintiff
brought an action based on same policy, but alleged fraud
and deceit by the company in inducing him to sign the reinstatement application. The jury returned a verdict of
$500.00 actual and $1,000.00 punitive damages.
The appellate court reversed, saying that the doctrine of
res judicatawas clearly applicable to the case. The court cited
Johnson v. CarolinaLife Insurance Co.57 In the Johnson case,
Helen Johnson brought action against the insurance company as beneficiary under a $120.00 insurance policy, in which
the intervenor Ransom' Johnson, was the named beneficiary.
It was held that Ransom Johnson was the beneficiary and
proceeds paid to him. Thereafter Helen Johnson brought suit
56. 202 S. C. 316, 24 S. E. 2d 609 (1943).
57. 200 S. C. 308, 20 S. E. 2d 713 (1942).
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against the insurance company for damages for failure to
change the policy and make her the beneficiary. The court
held that the first suit was controlling and that the doctrine
of res judicata was applicable. To hold otherwise, the Court
said, is to give respondent two bites at the cherry when in
contemplation of law, they are entitled to but one.
5.

No injury has been done to insured.

The latest case to plead this defense is Barnes v. Industrial
Life & Health Insurance Co. of Atianta.5 s There the agent of
defendant company had fraudulently mis-stated the age of
applicant at 55 when she had informed him 65. Premiums were
collected at the rate of 15 per week for 78 weeks on a policy
providing for $72.00 death benefit. At that time agent of defendant company induced plaintiff to give up her policy and
sign a release therefor on payment of an amount equal to the
sum of all premiums paid, to-wit, $11.70, by informing her
that mis-statement of age, and the old age pension law would
prohibit a recovery on the policy. Thereafter suit was brought
and company agreed to return policy upon return of premiums. Facts also show that plaintiff had procured a similar
policy for $72.00 from a different company at the rate of 10
per week. The court decided that disregarding the fact that
plaintiff had held policy 18 months without examining it, the
verdict should still be for defendant because the offer to return the policy and waiving interim premiums repudiated the
fraud of its agents, and further plaintiff had suffered no actual damages; and any presuiption of the existence of nominal damages not capable of exact measurement had been affirmatively dissipated by the procurement by plaintiff of
another policy of insurance in another company in the identical amount, and at a smaller premium.
While the rule has been stated in some jurisdictions that the
amount of damages for fraudulent breach of insurance contract is the difference in cost of breached contract and a similar policy, such does not seem to be the rule in South Carolina. In Rogers v. Jefferson StandardLife Insurance Co.,59 it
was held that the actual damage for breach of two $5,000.00
life policies with disability clauses was in accordance with the
58. 201 S. C. 188, 22 S. E. 2d 1 (1942).
59. 182 S. C. 51, 188 S. E. 432 (1936).
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rule of Pack v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supraG and
was the amount of total premiums paid with interest, less the
payment and interest owing on policy loans. Punitive damages were agreed on in that case. It was pointed out that while
insured was still an insurable risk it would be impossible to
get a policy with annuity disability payments, as companies
have quit writing them. Same rule as to actual damages was
6
given in Latta v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. 1
It has been pointed out heretofore that a showing of nominal damages would support punitive damages, therefore a
defense that no injury has been done must also negative even
nominal damages in order for defendant to be accorded a
judgment.
III.

CONCLUSION

The law governing punitive damages for breach of contract is well settled in South Carolina and the decisions over
the past decade have not materially changed it. Fraud having been found by the jury, the jury is authorized upon a
finding of either nominal or actual damages, to set any sum
they choose as punitive damages. The first insurance case,
Williams v. Commercial Casualty Co.,62 in 1931 resulted in
a verdict of $30.00 actual and $1,000.00 punitive damages.
The fraud there was the act of the agent in selling a sample
copy. One of the latest decisions, Clinkscales v. North Carolina
Mutual Life Insurance Co.,63 awarded $1,500.00 actual and
punitive damages for fraudulent cancellation of a health, accident and death benefit policy that carried a 25 per week
premium. As pointed out so often by the court the factual situation of any case is controlling. The case of Crosby v. MetropolitanLife Insurance CoSA allowed $1,200.00 punitive damages when the actual damages were $11.70 and seemed to set
the highest proportion for punitive over actual damages. The
fraud there was a mis-statement of agent that plaintiff was
a beneficiary.
When a ,problem is controlled by the facts of the case, it
is exceedingly difficult to undertake to estimate any trend in
60.
61.
62.
63.

Footnote 13.
179 S. C. 376, 184 S. E. 157 (1936).
Footnote 4.
201 S. C. 375, 23 S. E. 2d 1 (1942).

64. Footnote 6.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1948

23

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1948], Art. 3
REVIEW SECTION

the decisions. It must be emphasized that the decisions in
South Carolina definitely do not indicate that there will be any
relaxation in the awarding of punitive damages for fraudulent
breach of insurance contracts accompanied by any fact that
is held to be fraudulent. If the cases do establish any trend
they can be set out under the following three main heads:
(1) The court's refusal to call all denials of liability a
fraudulent breach of contract.
In King v. North Carolina Mutual,a the alleged fraud was
the failure of insurance company to furnish plaintiff with application blanks for disability payments. The court held that
this action could not be evidence of a frudulent breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act.
In Barnes v. Industrial Life and Health Ins. Co. of Atlanta,6 the alleged fraud was the procurement of a release
from insured. The court held that such act could not be fraud
because the insured had not been injured as the evidence
showed that he had procured a similar policy with another
insurance company, and even at a smaller premium.
The alleged fraud in Moore v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
67
Co., supra,
was a failure of the company to issue a twentyyear policy. The facts there showed, however, that the insured
was advised at the time he made application that he was underweight and therefore ineligible for such policy. The court
held for the defendant company.
In Welch v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co., supra,68 the
Court held that the wrongful cancellation of a policy gave the
insured a right to actual damages, but that there was no fraudulent intention, and punitive damages could not be recovered.
(2) Court's tendency to make a remittance where punitive
damages are excessive.
The Court in Crosby v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,O
reduced the punitive damages from $2,400.00 to $1,200.00,
but actual damages were only $11.70. And in Alexander v.
65. 194 S. C. 367, 9 S. E. 2d 788 (1940).
66. Footnote 24.
67. Footnote 48.
68. Footnote 46.

69. Footnote 6.
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Durham Life Insurance Co., supra70 the jury found actual
damage for breach of an insurance policy providing for $44.00
death benefit and $4.00 per week for 26 weeks disability payment, at $1,600.00. The court reduced this to $100.00. In the
case of Speed v. American Workmen Insurance Co.,71 the jury
found the actual damages at $296.00 and punitive damages at
$800.00. The court lowered the punitive damages to $400.00
and otherwise affirmed the verdict. And in Weaver v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,72 in an action on a $500.00 policy,
the jury found the actual damages at $493.24 and set the punitive damages at $750.00. The court reduced the actual damages by ordering remittitur of $332.27, and otherwise affirmed.
(3) The application of doctrine of res judicata to prevent
plaintiff from bringing a second cause of action on a different
theory on the identical set of facts.
In Glenn v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co." 3 the insured
sued for disability benefits, but the court directed a verdict
for the insurer. Later plaintiff brought an action for fraud
and deceit based on application for reinstatement for the purpose of depriving the insured of the disability payment. The
Court held the second action was barred by the rule of res
judicata and dismissed the action.
And in Smith v. Volunteer Life Insurance Compan," 4 it
was held that a prior suit in Federal Court for the face value
of the policy was a bar to a subsequent suit in the state court
based on the same act.
The attitude of the Federal District Court is shown in the
case of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. of California v.
Rhame. That was an action by plaintiff insurance company
against the defendant insured, for a declaratory judgment
with respect to an insurance contract. In a former action on
this policy by Rhame against the company in the state court,
70. Footnote 15.
71. Footnote 31.
72. 197 S. C. 363, 15 S. E. 2d 673 (1941).
73. Footnote 56.
74. Footnote 55.
75. 32 Fed. Supp. 59 (1940); also in state action, see 179 S. C. 297,
184 S. E. 685 (1936).
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the insured had brought suit to recover benefits, which would
have accrued to him but for the fraudulent breach and cancellation of policy and actual and punitive damages alleged
to have been sustained as a result thereof. The court held that
there was a question for the jury and the verdict was given
for $1,000.00 actual and $700.00 punitive damages, on a disability policy with $100.00 per month payments. Now the insurance company seeks a complete determination of the rights
of the parties under the contract in the Federal District Court.
Two questions involved: First, whether the Court should
take the view that the judgment of the State Court in favor
of defendant should be construed as a suit on the contract,
and not a tort, and second, whether the court, in the absence
of any definite expression by Supreme Court of South Carolina on appeal as to the nature of the action, should refuse
the declaratory judgment and permit defendant to bring his
action for continued disability benefits claimed under the
contract of insurance; as the result of which action, the Supreme Court will be in a position to construe its own decision.
The Court held:
"Under this court's view of South Carolina decision
on election of remedies, punitive damages are allowed
only when insured's rights under contract of insurance
have been surrendered and released and so recognized
by him. And the court is bound by what insured did at
that time, and not his present claim.
"Should plaintiff be denied his relief on assumption that
insured may induce South Carolina Supreme Court to do
what it has not done and what, as this court is convinced,
would be a reversal of the law of the State of South Carolina in its recognition of doctrine of election of remedies."
The court went on to point out that in South Carolina cases
the insured may elect to enforce the contract or to treat it
as rescinded, citing Rogers v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., supra,76 Alexander v. Durham Life Insurance
Co., supra,7 and especially the case of Shuler v. Equitable Life
76. Footnote 59.
77. Footnote 18.
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Assurance Society of U. S.,78 where Justice Fishburne points
out the three courses available to insured when insurer wrongfully cancels the policy.
"(1) He may elect to treat the policy as still in force,
and let the test of the validity of the cancellation repudiation await until the policy is payable and is sued on;
(2) he may sue in equity to set aside the cancellation,
and to have the policy declared to be valid and in force;
or (3) he may maintain an action at law to recover damage for the wrongful cancellation or repudiation.
"Defendant chose as his remedy the alternative of treating the contract at an end and instituting an action at
law to recover damages for its wrongful cancellation or
repudiation. He did not treat the policy as still being in
force, or of suing in equity, to have the cancellation set
aside and policy declared to be valid and in force.
"To treat the contract at an end for the purpose of recovering damages for its breach, and therefore to seek
to have it treated as in force, is to occupy positions, not
only inconsistent, but repugnant to each other."
This case was decided subsequent to the celebrated case of
E rie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins,79 and by the rule of that case the
Federal District Court must apply the law of South Carolina
to the problem. This decision is worthy of attention as it gives
the Federal District Court's view of the South Carolina law
where a suit has been brought for fraudulent breach of insurance contract. The court held that such action is a repudiation of the contract and an extinguishment of the right of
the parties under such contract. The Shuler case, cited by the
Federal District Court as giving the rule in South Carolina
does not seem to go that far. In the Shuler case the insurance
company wrongfully cancelled the contract by refusing premiums, and required an application for the reinstatement of
the policy. Thereafter the company relied on the facts in the
application for reinstatement to deny liability and insured
brought an action for fraudulent cancellation, and the court
held for the insured. Later the beneficiary under the policy
brought an action on the same policy, and while relief is denied her as her rights are only contingent, the court recog78. 184 S. C. 485, 193 S. E. 46 (1937).

79. 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817; 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
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-nizes that the policy is still in effect and valid and that the
action by the insured did not terminate it. Of course in the
Rhame case, the South Carolina Supreme Court did not decide whether the policy was still in effect and left the question
open leaving the opening upon which the Federal District
Court later based its decision.
The case is also an example of a determination of rights
-of parties to an insurance contract under the declaratory
judgment law. It seems to follow the trend of the courts to
allow an insured only one action against an insurance company for breach of contract, and to bind him by his election.
This review makes it clear that an insurance company doing
business in South Carolina is subject to the possibility of
heavy punitive damages for alleged fraudulent breach of contract. In many instances the companies have been unfairly
-treated by juries. On the other hand, the companies, usually
through incompetent or unworthy agents, have given the insured a raw deal in other cases. A contract that gives careful consideration to the factors set out above, plus a careful
selection of agents, and their subsequent proper training, is
the first step in combatting an unfortunate situation.
With this as a foundation, it is submitted that circumstances
calling for punitive damages will less frequently exist, and
that the companies will be in a position successfully to defend
unwarranted claims for punitive damages under the existing
laws of South Carolina.
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